Endogamous Marriage among Immigrant Groups: The Impact of Deportations under Secure Communities

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Research Question

- Main question: What was the impact of immigration enforcement under the Secure Communities program on the marriage incidence and marriage patterns of foreign born women in the U.S.?
- We combine marriage data form the ACS with interior enforcement data from TRAC Syracuse to see if there are 10-year responses in terms of marriage rates for immigrant women in the US to increased deportation rates.
- Focus on the incidence and patterns of:
 - 1. *Endogamous* marriage= married to someone from the same country of origin; intra-ethnic marriage
 - 2. *Exogamous* marriage=married to someone from another country or a native; inter-ethnic marriage

Preview of Results

Focusing on immigrant women, we find that deportations:

- 1. Increase overall marriage rates
- 2. Increase the likelihood of endogamous marriage
- 3. *Do not increase* exogamous marriage to natives and immigrants from other countries

We also find:

- 1. Demographic heterogeneity: by age, education, country of origin, citizenship status
- 2. No evidence of Selection: results not driven by location choices
- 3. Not a mechanical result of deportations
- 4. Other outcomes shed light into behavioral response: increased spousal co-residence, children in residence, age gap
- 5. Flows into marriage: indicate complexity of timing of response
- 6. Main channel/mechanism: Co-ethnic networks matter most as dominant channel

Why Focus on Endogamous Marriages? Exogamy since 1960



ACS Data: Marriage Patterns of Foreign Born Women Ages 18-54, Years 2005-2007

Rates of endogamous marriage are high

Country of Origin	Married (%)	Of Married, Spouse Present				
		Immigrant	Immigrant			
		Same Country (%)	Other Country (%)	Native (%)		
Mexico	64.42	82.93	3.42	13.65		
El Salvador	55.49	64.82	23.54	11.64		
Guatemala	54.44	65.96	22.00	12.04		
Dom. Republic	42.13	65.12	14.27	20.61		
Jamaica	41.71	64.09	12.09	23.82		
Colombia	60.35	52.51	20.01	27.49		
Ecuador	60.55	65.52	14.27	20.21		
China	75.09	78.53	11.08	10.39		
Korea	66.25	69.80	4.68	25.52		
India	83.74	91.12	4.04	4.84		
All	64.31	67.46	10.76	21.78		
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Source: American Community Survey, Years 2005-2007.

ACS data: Trends in Marriage Incidence and Patterns





Source: American Community Survey, Years 2005-2018. Foreign born women, 18-54.

Theories and Determinants of Endogamy

- Theories of joint consumption and assortative matching (Becker 1973, Lundberg 2011; Lam 1988; and Stevenson and Wolfers 2017)
- Some Predictions of theory: more endogamy for those with similar education, same ethnic background, recent arrivals, shared travel preferences, similar language, cultural preference and residential networks(Kalmijn and Tubergen 2010, Furtado and Trejo 2013, and Foad 2018)
- Determinants: Education, Age of arrival, Years since migration, size of enclave (Chiswick and Houseworth 2011)
- Empirical evidence of exogamy: greater earnings, employment, mobility, home ownership (Meng and Gregory (2005), Furtado and Theodoropolous 2010).
- Empirical evidence of endogamy: fewer divorces, lower child drop out, lower labor force participation of women (Chiswick and Houseworth 2020, Kalmijn et al. 2005, Furtado 2009).

Our Contribution: Endogamy and Immigration Policy

- We looked at the impact of immigration policy on endogamy.
- The Secure Communities Program (discussed on the next slide) likely had a larger impact on immigrant women from similar origin countries of the deportees, as endogamous, or intra-ethnic marriage is the dominant form of partnership among first, and in some cases, second generation immigrants in the U.S.
- Increased internal enforcement could affect endogamy and result in potential long-run unintended consequences on family formation, intergenerational mobility, and the importances of networks.

Immigration Enforcement: Secure Communities

- Federal program that began in 2008 to expedite the removal of non-citizens with criminal records
- Goal to increase coordination between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and local law enforcement on deportation of non-citizens accused of crimes
- Under the program participating law enforcement agencies run fingerprints of arrested individuals through the federal immigration database, which alerts ICE if there is a match.
- ICE can then review the file and issue a detainer to the local jail, asking officials to retain the individual so that ICE can take them into custody and begin deportation proceedings.

How Was it Enforced? Prosecutorial Discretion and "Felons Not Families"

Prosecutorial discretion is the authority of an agency or officer to decide what charges to bring and how to pursue each case. In the immigration context, federal authorities have exercised their discretion by declining to arrest immigrants; declining to pursue a case; declining to oppose an application for relief; or deferring the removal of an immigrant.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.opw/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration
The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
November 20, 2014
Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation
on Immigration

I want to say more about this third issue, because it generates the most passion and controversy. Even as we are a nation of immigrants, we're also a nation of laws. Undocumented workers borke our immigration laws, and I believe that they must be held accountable — especially those who may be dangerous. That's why, over the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent. And that's why we're going to keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mom who's working hard to provide for her kids. We'll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.

TRAC data: Advantages of Using Secure Communities Removals as Measure of Enforcement

- We obtained data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Syracuse on the total removals under Secure Communities by <u>location</u> and country of origin
- Origination of proceedings with local police means records more likely capture where a person resides in the U.S. (as opposed to where deported from)
- Actual Enforcement:Captures actual rather than intended immigration enforcement.The two may differ if local police are not willing or able to detain individuals for immigration violations or report them to ICE for possible removal
- By country of origin within an MSA we can model marriage markets at the MSA and country of origin level.

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DHS Enforcement, : Removal Orders Sought . . . Nature of Charge for Removal Orders . . . ICE Tangeting: Odds Noncitizens Ordered Deported Number of Noncitizens Allowed to Remain

Immigration Court, : Backlog of Pending Cases . . . Average Wait Time for Pending Cases . . . Removal Orders Granted . . . Relief Granted





Border Patrol Arrests (through April 2018)

 Latest Data October 2014 through April 2018



ICE Detainers (through June 2020)

- Latest Data October 2002 through June 2020
 More Complete Historical Data
- October 2002 through November 2015



ICE Arrests in the Interior of the U.S. (through May 2018)

 Latest Data October 2014 through May 2018



ICE Detention (through July 2019)

Latest Data



Latest Data

- October 2002 through February 2020
- More Complete Historical Data
 October 2002 through January 2016



ICE Removals - Under Secure Communities (through April 2019)

Available Data
 November 2008 through April 2019

TRAC data: Deportations Under Secure Communities, 2008-2017



Source: TRAC Syracuse

TRAC data: Removals Secure Communities: Nov. 2008-July 2017

Country of Origin	Total Removals Secure Com.	Percent Total Removals	Percent Immigrant Population	Percent LHS Imm. Pop	Per Removals To Percent Imm Pop	Average Removal Rate
Mexico	348,471	76.70	29.61	49.94	2.59	5.67
El Salvador	22,715	5.00	2.92	4.49	1.71	7.73
Guatemala	27,131	5.97	1.84	2.94	3.25	19.08
Honduras	28,111	6.19	1.10	1.63	5.62	14.82
Dom. Republic	2,893	0.64	2.12	2.52	0.30	2.52
Jamaica	2,092	0.46	1.70	1.11	0.27	2.46
Colombia	1,799	0.40	1.63	1.04	0.24	2.52
Nicaragua	2,004	0.44	0.65	0.55	0.68	3.24
Brazil	1,586	0.35	0.96	0.65	0.36	3.90
Ecuador	1,472	0.32	1.07	1.04	0.30	2.36
China	594	0.13	3.61	3.01	0.04	0.31
Korea	574	0.13	2.76	1.31	0.05	0.16
India	571	0.13	4.06	1.57	0.03	0.32

Source: TRAC Syracuse and the ACS.

Removals Secure Communities: Nov. 2008-July 2017

Country of	Total Removals	Percent Total	Percent Immigrant	Percent LHS	Per Removals To Percent	Average Removal
Origin	Secure Com.	Removais	Population	imm. Pop	imm Pop	Rate
Mexico	348,471	76.70	29.61	49.94	2.59	5.67
El Salvador	22,715	5.00	2.92	4.49	1.71	7.73
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India	571	0.13	4.06	1.57	0.03	0.32

Source: TRAC Syracuse and the ACS.

Removals Secure Communities: Nov. 2008-July 2017 in Los Angeles

Country of Origin	Total Removals Secure Com.	Percent Total Removals	Percent Immigrant Population	Percent LHS Imm. Pop	Per Removals To Percent Imm Pop	Average Removal Rate
Mexico	42,412	76.47	14.68	63.92	5.21	2.23
El Salvador	4,077	7.35	2.16	8.18	3.40	1.34
Guatemala	4,140	7.46	1.42	5.78	5.25	2.06
Honduras	1,816	3.27	0.26	1.04	12.65	5.27
Dom. Republic	18	0.03	0.02	0.01	2.03	0.54
Colombia	122	0.22	0.17	0.26	1.33	0.51
China	124	0.22	1.09	2.03	0.21	0.08
Korea	197	0.36	1.65	1.77	0.22	0.09
India	33	0.06	0.52	0.52	0.11	0.05

Source: TRAC Syracuse and the ACS.

Taken together, both the ACS statistics and Secure Communities enforcement data clearly show that marriage markets are concentrated among co-ethnics and the shocks to these markets as measured by deportations vary by country of origin group and not necessarily by MSA.

Conceptual Framework: Supply and Demand in Marriage Markets for Immigrant Women

- Supply side: could increase (exogamy or endogamy
 - 1. Decrease deported men are no longer available
 - 2. Increase immigrant men wanting to marry
- Demand side for marriage: could increase for multiple reasons
 - 1. Increase women want to marry citizen or native born men
 - 2. Increase co-ethnic networks become even more important
- Overall, the shifts in supply and demand will have an ambiguous prediction on the incidence of marriage.

Conceptual Framework for Change in Composition

- Endogamous
 - 1. Decrease due to lower ethnic network from deportations
 - Decrease if immigrant women find naturalized citizens or native born more desirable due to legal status (Smith Kelly 2010, Meng and Gregory 2005, Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2010)
 - 3. *Increase* if the ability to become a legalized immigrant through marriage is difficult, particularly for unauthorized individuals; 3 and 10 year bars for re-entry before get LPR or Greencard
 - 4. *Increase* if endogamous marriage may provide immediate safety and reassurance in the face of increased uncertainty for immigrant women. (Alsan and Yang 2018) cite increased fear among immigrant populations due to SC.
 - 5. *Increase* if networks increase in importance. Kets and Sandroni (2019) explain that homophily arises out of a desire to reduce strategic uncertainty about others' actions.
 - Increase If parents who fear deportation want to leave their U.S. born children with relatives who remain in the U.S. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo 2019).
- Overall an ambiguous prediction

Empirical Strategy

 $\Delta Outcome_{js} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RemovalRate_{js} + \delta_j + \delta_s + \gamma * X_{js} + \epsilon_{js}$

- Outcome variable: change in the average marriage rates and patterns of women from country j, living in CBSA s from 2005-2007 to 2015-2017
- Similar to Monras (2020) we also first difference the outcomes to avoid the problem of different cluster sizes.
- The data is at the country of origin-MSA level.

Matching the Data: ACS and TRAC

- We match the arrest data from TRAC to the outcomes of immigrant women in the residing in the U.S.in the ACS; Match by CBSA and Country of Origin
- We focus on metropolitan statistical areas, as measured by Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)
- CBSAs are preferable to PUMAs, because they cover multiple states.ACS covers 75 percent of CBSAs.
- There are 290 CBSAs in our sample and 167 countries of origin, generating 28,203 country of origin-MSA cells. However, only 9,495 cells have anyone in both periods, and only 4,249 have more than five women in each period. Finally, only 3,670 cells have more than five women and no missing marriage values. In terms of the number of countries of origin represented in MSAs, the average number is 74.7.

Estimation Strategy

- By estimating changes we control for pre-Secure Communities differences in MSA-country of origin cells
 - Ex: Mexican migrants in L.A. may be more likely to be in endogamous marriages because the population of co-ethnics and possible marriage partners is very large.
- Control for MSA and country of origin fixed effects
- Weight all observations by the size of the country of origin population in an MSA in the pre period
- Relevant variation used to identify changes in marriage outcomes as a function of cumulative deportation rates is changes in marriage patterns for a country of origin within an MSA
 - Ex: We examine how changes in marriage patterns of Mexican born women in L.A. vs. New York relate to deportation rates for Mexican born individuals in L.A. versus New York

Controls to address possible threats to identification

X_{sj} =Country of origin-MSA controls

- 1. The log of total number of immigrant men in the pre period in an MSA from a country of origin (population effect)
- 2. The percentage of the pre-period foreign-born population with less than a high school education (unauthorized effect)
- 3. Foreign-born men and women as a percentage of the MSA population (enclave effect)
- 4. Sex ratio (more men effect)

Regression Results: Women's Marriage Patterns

		Of Married, Spouse Present					
	(1) Married	(2) Immigrant Same Country	(3) Immigrant Other Country	(4) Native			
PANEL A: No Controls							
SC Deportation Rate	0.353**	0.342*	-0.347**	0.005			
	(0.143)	(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.154)			
Observations	3,634	3,624	3,624	3,624			
PANEL B: Control Set 1							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
SC Deportation Rate	0.351**	0.330*	-0.318*	-0.012			
	(0.145)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.153)			
Observations	3,626	3,616	3,616	3,616			
PANEL C: Control Set 2							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
SC Deportation Rate	0.453***	0.422**	-0.385**	-0.037			
	(0.156)	(0.177)	(0.171)	(0.155)			
Observations	3,535	3,525	3,525	3,525			

Heterogeneity

We estimate results separately by different demographic groups:

- For marriage incidence, deportations effect is larger for college educated individuals. Table of Heterogeneity Results
- For composition (endogamy), results are stronger non-citizens, those with less than a college education
- By age groups, we find similar results across the two age groups, but find larger coefficients in absolute value and smaller standard errors for the older group
- By country of origin, we find that Mexican born women do not drive the findings on marriage incidence or patterns, particularly for endogamy. Results are strongest for individuals from South American when look at patterns by Country of Origin. By Region
- By years in the US, those with less than 5 years of time in the US are significantly less likely to marry a native. By Time in US.

Selection

Is this about changes in who lives where (not marriage markets)?

- No: Find immigrant women are not more likely to live without their spouse, be divorced or separated Other Outcomes Table
- Possibly: Women in endogamous marriages could be more likely to move to MSAs with higher immigration enforcement while those in exogamous marriage are more likely to move to MSAs with lower enforcement (migration out of gateway cities) Selection Evidence
- We find little evidence this happened (using women who moved to the U.S. before age 18 (marriage in the U.S.), and women who did not arrive in the past year) Selection Robustness

Channels: Protection vs. Networks

Marriage patterns arise from preferences and opportunity (Kalmijin 1998)

- Channel 1: Protection from deportation by marrying a citizen (less endogamy)
- Channel 2: Networks provide safety and security (increase endogamy)
 - Marriage as protection
 - Increased importance or concentration of networks

Channels: Spousal Citizenship as Safety from Deportation

- If the dominant motivation is protection, marriage to a citizen is the safest
- But we find no significant increase in marriage to natives or foreign born citizens

	Spouse Citizen	Spouse S	Same Country	Spouse Different Country	
	(1)	(2) Spouse Citizen	(3) Spouse Not Citizen	(4) Spouse Citizen	(5) Spouse Not Citizen
SC Deportation Rate	-0.239 (0.191)	0.067 (0.149)	0.263 (0.200)	-0.293*** (0.113)	-0.027 (0.123)
Observations	3,616	3,616	3,616	3,616	3,616

Note: All regressions include country of origin and MSA fixed effects. Sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods. In all regressions observations are weighted by the cell size (immigrant population from country of origin in an MSA) in the pre period. *Source:* ACS and TRAC

Women's Partnership Patterns, Unmarried

- Cohabitation has limited legal benefits, so changes in partnership should more strongly reflect changes in the value of networks
- Estimates are less precisely estimated, but the signs of the coefficients are similar to main results

	Of Unmarried, Partner Present				
	(1) Immigrant Same Country	(2) Immigrant Other Country	(3) Native		
SC Deportation Rate	0.367 (0.883)	-0.344 (0.633)	-0.023 (0.856)		
Observations	1,292	1,292	1,292		

Note: All regressions include country of origin and MSA fixed effects. Sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods. In all regressions observations are weighted by the cell size (immigrant population from country of origin in an MSA) in the pre period. *Source*: ACS and TRAC

Conclusions

- Examine the impact of deportations under Secure Communities on the marriage patterns of immigrant women in the U.S.
- Detailed deportation data allow us to exploit differences across cities and countries of origin
- Find that Secure Communities led to an <u>increase</u> in endogamous marriage and a <u>decrease</u> in exogamous marriage
- An analysis of unmarried partners and the citizenship of immigrant spouses suggests the policy increased the importance of country of origin networks

Mechanics

Reasons why deportation rates likely do not have a mechanical relationship with our outcome variables.

- 1. Very few women were deported (reason to focus on women not men)
- 2. We find no increase in women who live without their spouses. Also if foreign born women moved with their deported spouses this would work against our findings
- 3. The same denominator is not on both sides (women versus entire population).

Regression Results: Women's Marriage Patterns Back

		Of M		
	(1) Married	(2) Immigrant Same Country	(3) Immigrant Other Country	(4) Native
PANEL A: Naturalized Citizens	0.063	0.206	0.075	-0.281
SC Deportation Rate	(0.285)	(0.270)	(0.383)	(0.387)
PANEL B: Non Citizens	0.452**	0.576**	-0.467**	-0.108
SC Deportation Rate	(0.188)	(0.238)	(0.189)	(0.185)
PANEL C: College SC Deportation Rate	0.806** (0.361)	-0.347 (0.409)	-0.312 (0.334)	- 0.659 (0.471)
PANEL D: Less than College	0.312*	0.450**	-0.357*	-0.093
SC Deportation Rate	(0.186)	(0.224)	(0.203)	(0.189)
PANEL E: Ages 18-35	0.321	0.103	-0.137	0.034
SC Deportation Rate	(0.263)	(0.297)	(0.258)	(0.329)
PANEL F: Ages 36-54	0.329	0.526**	-0.186	-0.340
SC Deportation Rate	(0.211)	(0.215)	(0.229)	(0.248)
PANEL G: Mexican Born Only SC Deportation Rate	0.182 (0.186)	-0.437* (0.259)	0.003 (0.080)	- 0.434* (0.222)
PANEL H: Excluding Mexican Born	0.228	0.363* < 🗆	0.294	-0.069
SC Deportation Rate	(0.155)	(0.213)	(0.255)	(0.172)

31 / 29

Selection:Percent Recent Migrants

			Of Marri	ed, Spouse Prese	nt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	Married	Immigrant Same Country	Immigrant Other Country	Native
PANEL A: % New Residents					
SC Deportation Rate	-0.093	0.020	0.105	0.003	-0.130
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.018)	(0.089)
Observations	3,634	3,627	3,624	3,624	3,624

The outcome if the percentage of each group that located in the MSA the past year. All regressions include country of origin and MSA fixed effects. Sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods.In all regressions observations are weighted by the cell size (immigrant population from country of origin in an MSA) in the pre period). *Source*: ACS and TRAC

Selection Slide

Women's Marriage Patterns, Selection

		Of Marr	ied, Spouse Prese	nt
	(1) Married	(2) Immigrant Same Country	(3) Immigrant Other Country	(4) Native
PANEL A: Arrived Young				
SC Deportation Rate	0.052 (0.288)	0.107 (0.486)	-0.200 (0.410)	0.093 (0.412)
Observations	3,267	2,522´	2,522´	2,522 [´]
PANEL B: No New Arrivals				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SC Deportation Rate	0.308* (0.163)	0.309* (0.185)	-0.384** (0.185)	0.074 (0.160)
Observations	`3,624 [´]	`3,610 [´]	`3,610 [´]	`3,610 [´]

All regressions include MSA and country of origin fixed effects, the percentage of the MSA-country of origin population with less than a high school education and the total number of men from a country of origin in an MSA pre-Secure Communities. All regressions are weighted by the size of the pre-Secure communities country of origin-MSA population. The sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods. Panel A includes women who arrived in the U.S. prior to age 18. Panel B includes women who did not arrive in the past year (no new arrival). *Source*: ACS and TRAC



Other outcomes

	Married, Spouse		Divorced/Separated	Child	Age	- Age Education Gap	
	(1) Present	(2) Not Present	(3)	(4) Present	(5) Gap	(6) Equal or More	(7) Less
SC Deportation Rate	0.365** (0.148)	-0.013 (0.064)	0.046 (0.096)	0.215 (0.140)	3.383 (2.253)	-0.088 (0.191)	0.088 (0.191)
Observations	3,626	3,626	3,626	3,626	3,616	3,616	3,616

Return to Selection Slide

Women's Marriage by Region Back

			Region			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Mexico Cen.America	Caribbean	South America	Europe	Asia	Africa
PANEL A: Marriage						
SC Deportation Rate	0.064	2.363	1.758	-5.910	-10.513	9.238
<u>.</u>	(0.170)	(1.920)	(1.778)	(6.354)	(6.926)	(6.785)
Observations	371	210	337	811	1,246	310
PANEL B: Same						
SC Deportation Rate	0.572**	-2.111	4.383***	1.571	4.538	-10.044
	(0.266)	(2.040)	(1.362)	(8.171)	(6.819)	(9.568)
Observations	368	207	336	811	1246	307
PANEL C: Different						
SC Deportation Rate	-0.547*	3.957**	-1.552	-13.684*	0.928	5.753
	(0.287)	(1.853)	(1.581)	(7.230)	(6.038)	(7.448)
Observations	368	207	336	811	1246	307
PANEL D: Native						
SC Deportation Rate	-0.025	-1.846	-2.831	12.113	-5.466	4.291
	(0.186)	(2.532)	(1.860)	(7.548)	(6.915)	(7.047)
Observations	368	207	336	811	1,246	307

35 / 29

	Of Married, Spouse			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Married	Immigrant Same Country	Immigrant Other Country	Native
PANEL A: Mexican Born Only				_
SC Deportation Rate	0.182	-0.437*	0.003	0.434*
	(0.186)	(0.259)	(0.080)	(0.222)
Observations	186	186	186	186
PANEL B: Excluding Mexican Born				
SC Deportation Rate	0.228	0.363*	-0.294	-0.069
	(0.155)	(0.213)	(0.255)	(0.172)
Observations	3,449	3,439	3,439	3,439
PANEL C: In U.S.<=5years				
SC Deportation Rate	0.689	0.640	0.367	-1.007**
	(0.426)	(0.559)	(0.438)	(0.441)
Observations	2,945	2,458	2,458	2,458
PANEL D: In U.S.>5years				
SC Deportation Rate	0.213	0.330	-0.455**	0.125
	(0.163)	(0.203)	(0.197)	(0.178)
Observations	3,621	3,582	3,582	3,582

36 / 29

Alternative Deportation Rates: Region and MSA

		Of Married, Spouse Present		
	(1) Married	(2) Immigrant Same Country	(3) Immigrant Other Country	(4) Native
PANEL A: Regional Rate				
SC Deportation Rate, Region	0.474**	0.022	-0.115	0.093
	(0.233)	(0.268)	(0.196)	(0.240)
Observations	3626	3616	3616	3616
PANEL B: MSA Rate				
SC Deportation Rate, MSA	0.105	-0.576**	0.117	0.459**
	(0.189)	(0.241)	(0.107)	(0.212)
Observations	`3660 <i>´</i>	`3650 ´	` 3650´	`3650´

Note:All regressions contain country of origin fixed effects, the log of total of bpl immigrant men in the pre period, and bpl men and women as a percentage of the MSA population. The regressions in Panel A also include MSA fixed effects. The sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods and results are weighted by the cell size in the pre period. When we take fixed effects out of Panel A the signs on endogamous marriage and native marriage switch. Thus the MSA fixed effects are pretty important. *Source:* ACS and TRAC

Robustness Checks: Cell Size, Post years, and alternative **Deportation Rates**

		Of Married, Spouse Present		
	(1) Married	(2) Immigrant Same Country	(3) Immigrant Other Country	(4) Native
PANEL A: MultiYear ACS Pre-Period	0.276**	0.304**	-0.199	-0.105
SC Deportation Rate	(0.119)	(0.145)	(0.151)	(0.130)
PANEL B: No Cell Size Limit	0.242*	0.321	-0.112	-0.209*
SC Deportation Rate	(0.138)	(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.126)
Observations	8,398	7,296	7,296	7,296
PANEL C: 2014-2016 Post Period	0.417***	0.312*	-0.398**	0.087
2008-2017 SC Deportation Rate	(0.135)	(0.169)	(0.157)	(0.145)
PANEL D: 2008-2014 Deportation Rate 2008-2014 SC Deportation Rate	0.522**	0.408	-0.440	0.032
	(0.232)	(0.298)	(0.271)	(0.242)
PANEL E: Alt. Post and Rate	0.456**	0.276	-0.456*	0.180
2008-2014 SC Deportation Rate	(0.215)	(0.287)	(0.236)	(0.232)
PANEL F: 2012-2014 Deporation Rate	0.641	1.044*	-0.346	-0.698*
2012-2014 SC Deportation Rate	(0.392)	(0.572)	(0.572)	(0.388)
PANEL G: Without Border MSAs	0.310*	0.254	-0.251	-0.003
SC Deportation Rate	(0.163)	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.167)

Note: All regressions include country of origin and MSA fixed effects. Sample is limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods. In all regressions observations are weighted by the cell size

38 / 29

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Regression Results: Recent Marriages: Flows

	Married, Spouse Present			
	(1) Immigrant Same Country	(2) Immigrant Other Country	(3) Native	
PANEL A: Current Year SC Deportation Rate, Current Year	0.573	0.185	-0.758	
Observations	(1.866) 22,712	(0.697) 22,712	(1.820) 22,712	
PANEL B: Two Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	
SC Deportation Rate, Last 2 Years	0.335	0.009	-0.345	
Observations	(0.926) 22,712	(0.342) 22,712	(0.980) 22,712	
PANEL C: Three Years	(1)	(2)	(3)	
SC Deportation Rate, Last 3 Years	0.221	-0.035	-0.186	
Observations	(0.623) 22,712	(0.242) 22,712	(0.678) 22,712	

All regressions contain MSA and country of origin fixed effects. Sample limited to immigrant groups with more than 5 women in an MSA in both periods and all results weighted by the cell size in the pre period. *Source*: ACS and TRAC

For each individual ICE deports, information on the city and state the fingerprint record was originally submitted from, the nature of the immigration violation giving rise to their deportation, the type of agency and program that led to their apprehension (including whether use of a detainer was involved and whether the arrest occurred at the border or in the interior of the country), the year the individual had last entered the United States and their entry status at that time. In addition to demographic information, detailed criminal histories for each individual are available. Findings reported are based on TRAC's detailed analysis of these case-by-case ICE records.